
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















Finally, in a day and compared to the category of reference (ie, the costs of the no result indicators), an increase in standard deviation in the process indicators and Having decreases the likelihood of executing the service within a private company for, respectively, 0.065, 0.059 and 0.044. The maintenance of roads and parking management also has a similar score in both characteristics. With governance, we refer to the processes by which the organizations are directed, controlled and kept in account (IFAC 2001, 1). Wiesel and Modell (2014) describe the wide of governant it is visible in the organizations of the pilling sector: the administration of the progressive pill (PPA), a new plastic manage (NPM) and the new governance (NPG). Up to where we know, however, there is now a lack of emphasis on these modes of delivery to the Netherlands, but they may be important for complex contracts in construction and infrastructure, as shown by Brown et al. From a legal perspective, internal production and inter-municipal cooperation is subject to public law, while a company owned by the municipality and a private company is subject to private law (by Example, Gradus et al. Next, and on ON, the number of indicators for each of these types by the total number of indicators (regardless of their type). Since municipalities can not only differ in the (relative) (relative) that they place in different types of performance indicators, we also estimate our model based on these characteristics for proxy the governance model of the municipalities (see tables 5 and 6) .31 In general, we hope that, as municipalities (in (in To formulate more goals and use more output indicators and results, they are most oriented towards the use of governance principles, as recommended by NPM and NPG paradigms rather than those recommended by the PPA paradigm. Future research can also be taken into account additional proxies to adopt a certain governance, such as (for example) the elements of the PPA, NPM and NPG that Blokker et al. Likewise, in the United States and the Netherlands, payroll administration is seen as a fan of measuring and requiring few spectable investments of active. For the collection of waste Spain, platter £ az et al. After removing observations with missing values for one or more of the wariables, we had a data set of 868 observations of the municipality's service available to the dwarfs reported in this article.12 In this study, we focus in 12 municipal services, ranging from ¢ â Âdy â "GERBAGE COLLECTION £ o ¢ â Â € Paraâ € œ Parking Management € (see Figure 1) .13 These services mainly internal tasks of facilitation and external service delivery tasks. In this study, we are interested in whether the Dutch municipalities provide these services, in cooperation with neighboring municipalities, 15 or if they hire them to external companies (municipalities or private). Believe that the autonomization is not a single -dimensional construction, as different factors (for example, legal factors, administrative and eco -manned pages) play a role in the distinction of the women of the women autonomization. (2015) showed that the municipalities are occupied mainly with the execution of policies that are delegated by the highest of government. Finally, for asset evaluation (tax assessment), we noticed some differences, but probably due to differences in the institutional structure of both matters. Ches's questionnaire (see Bakker et In addition, in addition, in addition, in addition, in addition, in additional dwarfs, we also use an alternative proxy by analyzing the (absolute) objective of formulated objectives and using performance indicators (of different types). For financial characteristics, we take the funds rate not reserved and show that the municipalities of municipalities of municipalities with a better financial position are less likely to be hired for a private company. In addition, a standard deviation increased in the number of objectives increases the likelihood of executing the service within a company owned by the municipality by 0.044. For the municipality by 0.044. For the municipality by 0.044. For the municipality is a little different from what we expected, but it can be explained by the relatively close relationship between a company and the municipality (s) as its owner (s) (s) (s). 2015 for an evaluation of the reliability and validity of this question). In his research, successful hiring were classified by city managers. However, with the widespread admonition of the NPM and NPG governance, many of these organizations increasingly changed the focus for the use of production and (especially under NPG result indicators). In order to obtain the necessary data for this study, we gathered the annual reports for 2010 of the 86 municipalities who responded to our initial research. As previous research has shown that NPM reforms are often implemented in a specific sector in the form of a package, we hope these reforms will be interrelated. If the servants can be easily and precisely measured, the risk of not seeing as per performance or neglect will be smaller than under the opposite condition. 2014). 2003). A problem in this manner (vif Mã © dio = ¢ â, 2,43; between 1.13 (for left-right guidance) and 4.87 (for the number of objectives))), neither in the dwarf, including the left-right guidance MC (Vif Vifã ¢. 2,53; between 1.20 (for specificity of assets) and 4.85 (for the number of objectives.). These activities are part of processes that occur within institutions to generate results (â € œProductsâ €), which interact with the environment (in particular, with those individuals and groups to whom they are specifically pointed), leading to (intermediate and final) results. The other models were not supported. Gradus and Botture (2016) found some evidence of an ideological motivation to change the manner of garbage collection by the Dutch municipal councils and councilors. Local parts (LCG, LPG, LOG and OLG) are not analyzed in Ches. All our interviewees are a diploma as certified pill controllers or studying to obtain this diploma. Table 5 also shows that (compared to the other three institutional forms) hiring a service to a private company is more likely if there is a higher population density and, as a result, some indication for scope economies. Room, proxy for the governance of governance of production (in relative, but not absolutely) as less likely to privatize. The number of councilors varies according to the number of inhabitants. 2016). In addition, the contract is also related to the governance model of the municipalities as the municipalities of municipalities that (in general) place relatively less in the indicators of the municipalities that (in general) place relatively less in the indicators of the municipalities and performance model of the municipalities that (in general) place relatively less in the indicators of the municipalities and performance model of the municipalities preferences between the councils of councils of councils, for both pool -rise, a right -wing policy guidance is positively related to the privatization of the services. For the characteristics of the services and ease of media are potentially important to explain (absolute) of formulated objectives and performance indicators used â € hvs (of the four types), we calculate the natural balance of the fund balance is not reserved for total assets where, before calculating the natural log, we add 1.0 to produce positive values for this variable. At our emphasis on, we control several socio -economic characteristics: the number of inhabitants, population density, the number of people with benefits of unemployment (per 1,000 inhabitants, population density, the number of people with benefits of unemployment (per 1,000 inhabitants) and Mother Income by Fumãlia. For our review, we use data that was collected from several sources and take into account the service and municipal characteristics. In addition, research has also shown that municipality (usually) More in the indicators of inputs, processes and output, while this probability increases as a municipality (generally) puts more in the result indicators. Finally, the number of It is a little smaller than 42,500, the population density of about 550 inhabitants per square kilometers, the percentage of people with benefits of unemployment is about 1.4% and the income Mother by Fumãlia is 34,709. In the local government, there is a lot of discussion about the costeffectiveness of ICT, which implies that municipalities find it difficult to assess whether the invested money pays dividends. Finally, we collected data on the number reported of objectives formulated and use performance indicators, which we use to measure the characteristics of governance, of the annual reports of 2010 of the 86 municipalities who responded to our initial research. Cuadrado Ballesteros et al. In addition, although some differences are found between councils, for both policy, a right -wing policy guidance is positively related to privatization of the services. It should also be noted that the Dutch mayors are appointed by the central government, and their executive powers are limited (see also Belo et al. Traditionally, the organizations of the pilling sector have focused mainly on indicators Input and process. Finally, the results also show that the municipalities of municipalities that are a better financial position will be less likely to be hired for a private company. The bullies have recently been the subject of great renovations, particularly in the lands of local government. The marginal effects substantiate these findings and indicate this, in a day and compared to the category of reference (ie, the costs of the annual compared to the category of reference (ie, the costs of the annual compared to the category of reference (ie, the costs of the annual compared to the category of reference (ie, the costs of the annual compared to the category of reference (ie, the costs of the annual compared to the category of reference (ie, the costs of the annual compared to the category of reference (ie, the costs of the annual compared to the category of reference (ie, the costs of the annual compared to the category of reference (ie, the costs of the annual compared to the category of reference (ie, the costs of the annual compared to the category of reference (ie, the costs of the annual compared to the category of reference (ie, the costs of the annual compared to the category of reference (ie, the costs of the annual compared to the category of reference (ie, the costs of the annual compared to the category of reference (ie, the costs of the annual compared to the category of reference (ie, the costs of the annual compared to the category of reference (ie, the costs of the annual compared to the category of the annual compared to the category of the category of the annual compared to the category of t indicators increases the likelihood of executing the service internally for, respectively, 0.108, 0.075 and 0.050. 2003; Levin and Tadelis 2010). These reviews They show similar results for all variables â € ught remaining ones. Brown Potoski (2003) found that higher investments of assets are associated with a higher and less contract. For the number of inhabitants and the population density, we calculate the natural log to improve its distribution. Table 2 presents the descriptive statisticals for the variables, both independent, both in total and institutional form. 25, as observed in Table 2, the punctures Measurement, are 2,572 and 2,281, respectively, which indicates that, in motion, these variesable ones are scores between "low" and "mom". The Council (MC), the punishment of the day of ideological (left-right) orientation is about 0.57, which indicates that, in motion, these are Local poetics are a little more right than left. First, we use cross -sectional data in our study, while longitudinal data would be preferable to understanding the dynamic nature of contract decisions. If we eliminate the most influential data points, however, all the relationships we find at our main yet significant dwarfs. Tables 3 and 4, do not present these results. We hope that, when it is more in the production indicators and results, the most experienced and willing to go to their own administrative system in our case, hire serials. Marginal effects indicate that, in motion, an increase in standard deviation in the benefits of unemployment increases the likelihood of executing the probability of execute it within a Cooperation or within a company owned by the municipality at 0.017 and 0.030, respectively. These elements are even more important in the event of worse conditions of the labor market (see also dijkgraaf et al. The missing values are in the variable of institutional forms (due to the fact that some municipalities do not They perform all 12 services) and/or left -Right -oriented BMA. For this variance could be calculated). In the same way, the asset specificity scale was anchored by the very low (punctuated 1) and very high (punctuated 5) words., an increase in standard deviation in the number of objectives and results indicators decreases the likelihood of executing the service internally at 0.041 and 0.073, respectively, as a standard standard increased deviation in the number of indicators of input and process increases this probability by 0.031 and 0.063, Tiva. The Downsian model prevailed that the results of the Municipal Council, and not by the preferences of parties in power. Overall, they categorized 46% of these municipalities as focused mainly on NPG, 32% as being focused mainly on NPM and 22% as being focused mainly on NPM and 22% as being focused mainly on NPM. Currently, there is a discussion in the Netherlands the mayor must be strengthened by a direct election. This included all 430 municipalities at the time of research except the four largest. They found that the municipalities with the majority of the right -wing majority will be a greater preference for hiring what the municipalities with the municipali majority of Studies focus on garbage collection. 2003; Brown et al. Finally, the municipalities with a higher mother income by Fumalia also a greater likely to hire a service to a company owned by the municipality (instead of running internally or within a private company). For the Dutch municipalities, the transition from entry to the output and autonomization of the departments are among the most important changes (Van Helden and Jansen 2003). In addition, we perform separated dwarfs for the two variables â € hythms because they are a common cause (the results of an election) and therefore inherently correlated. Notably, however, we do not find this association for output indicators. We find that the municipalities of which the controversy (ie the aldermen and the municipalities with the left- the quidance of the wing of these poetic rolling seems to prefer pills. (2012) point out that local unions of the pilling sector or other interest groups may oppose especially the contract during the eco -end decal in tax crises. The services that involve more difficulty in measuring so is less likely to be hired for a private or owned company of the municipality. The influence of policy characteristics on the decisions of contract is one of the most researched questions, but also more inconclusive in this area. Since the quantity of a service can be less easily measured, hiring it to a company owned by the municipality or a private company is less. Councilors prefer to hire a private company owned by the municipality or a private company is less. Finally, for the financial organized as companies (see also gradus et al. For the characteristics of governance, the results show the results that a service is performed in a company owned by the municipality formulates more objectives., Like Portugal, this phenomenon also exists (for example, tavares and caman 2007). Levin and Tadelis (2010) used a slightly different approach. Regarding this last one, there seems to be Reasons for concern about the vião of selection, since local parties are very heterogeneous in terms of guidance to the left. 12 Municipal Services SÃ £ o: Garbage collection (residential collection of healthy waste); (tasks involved in payment of social Security (paying social benefits and provisional food out of the canteen (in meeting rooms, etc.)); cafeteria (food disposal within the canteen); ICT (IT services); Road maintenance (small infrastructure works, including street repair); Green maintenance (greenery maintenance (greenery maintenance, including trimming and planting); Sports installations (taking care of buildings for sports activities); asset evaluation (the evaluation of the real estate sector, especially for tax evaluation); Cleaning the municipal building (s)); Parking management (parking and planting); Sports installations (taking care of buildings for sports activities); asset evaluation (the evaluation); Cleaning (cleaning the municipal buildings for sports activities); asset evaluation (the evaluation); Cleaning (cleaning the municipal buildings for sports activities); asset evaluation (the evaluation); Cleaning (cleaning the municipal buildings for sports activities); asset evaluation (the evaluation); Cleaning the municipal buildings for sports activities); asset evaluation (the evaluation); Cleaning the municipal buildings for sports activities); asset evaluation (the evaluation); Cleaning the municipal buildings for sports activities); asset evaluation (the evaluation); Cleaning the municipal buildings for sports activities); asset evaluation (the evaluation); Cleaning the municipal buildings for sports activities); asset evaluation (the evaluation); Cleaning the municipal buildings for sports activities); asset evaluation (the evaluation); asset evaluation (the evaluation lots). We use the services identified by Wassenaar (2011) as a starting point for our municipal service selection. We also have These models focused only on the number of performance indicators used This study confirms this to the Netherlands, which is important, as the current fiscal crisis places local services under additional pressure. Research shows that a constellation of factors seems to be relevant to explain the options of the modes of provision of services. According to this model, the objectives concerned with these needs are established and inputs (employees, buildings, resources) with which to perform activities in search of these objectives acquired. If this is the case, the municipalities apparently require less direct control over the performance of the service and instead interested parties are mainly in their results (intermediate and final). The marginal effects indicate that, in motion, an increase in standard deviation in financial position increases the likelihood of executing the service internally or within a company owned by the municipality, respectively, 0.020 and 0.015, while decreasing the likelihood of executing the service within a private company at 0.032. (2013) showed, in Spain, that special forms of control is more in the results (Wiesel and Modell 2014). The specificity of assets refers to whether specialized investments are required to produce the service (Brown and Potoski 2003, 444). Our review suggests an important role for transactions, due to the specificity of assets and difficulty in measurement, in decisions of contracting for Dutch municipal services, although, Contrary to what we expected, we find that more asset specificity increases the likelihood of choices for the ownership municipalities (eg, example ,,,,, The output can be more fancil if neighboring municipalities also use external providers) and market concentration of private companies. Overall, this examination gave us few reasons to eliminate cases of our dw into the dwells. The NPM proposes to place the rendering of more distance services when hiring activities. Municipal ownership companies operate thus under private law, while their action fully belong to municipalities. As for the Netherlands, a recent study of Gradus and Botture (2016) also showed some evidence that our study provides additional information on the underlying factors of the municipalities of the municipalities of the modes of provision of services. -Horeirinter-Municipal Cooperation Municipality-OR-DESIGNED The Company Privise Firmotalasse Specification Difficulty Measurement Difficu (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 83 (9.6%) 2,752.88Catering34 (50.7%) 0 (0.0%) 4 (6.0%) 29 (43.3%) 67 (7.7%) 1,911.55capheteria23 (45.1%) 0 (0.0%) 82 (9.4%) 3.583.04 Maintings of roads60 (74.1%) 1 (1.2%) 2 (2.5%) 18 (22.2%) 81 (9.3%) 2.582.46 Green62 maidante (76.5%) 2 (2.5%) 5 (6.2%) 12 (14.8%) 81 (9.3%) 2 (2.4%) 82 (9.4%) 2 (2.4%) 82 (9.4%) 3 (9.7%) 5 (6.9%) 72 (8.3%) 3 (9.9%) 5 (6.5%) 55 (71.4%) 77 (8.9%) 1.501 .71 Parking Management29 (85.3%) 0 (0.0%) 2 (5.9%) 3 (8.8%) 34 (3.9%) 5 (6.5%) 55 (71.4%) 77 (8.9%) 1.501 .71 Parking Management29 (85.3%) 0 (0.0%) 2 (5.9%) 3 (8.8%) 34 (9.9%) 1.501 .71 Parking Management29 (85.3%) 10 (9.7%) 2 (9.9%) 3 (9.9%) 1.501 .71 Parking Management29 (85.3%) 10 (9.9%) 2 (9.9%) 3 (9.9%) 10 2.702.40total536 (61.8%) 77 (8.9%) 53 (6.1%) 202 (23.3%) ¢ Â Â € Table 2 Statistics Per Institutional FormÃÂ TotalInstitutional formTestsIn-houseInter-municipal cooperationMunicipality- owned firmPrivate firmF-testWelch testMeanSDMea specificity 2.5720.7252.6260.6382.8450.6552.8870.9352.2440.79323.448***18.946***Measurement difficulty 2.2810.5202.3950.4892.6530.4332.0000.4381 .9120.40676.750***89.665***Left-right orientation BMA0.5740.1080.5720.1090.5900.1070.5640.0960.5760.1060.7720.804Left-right orientation indicators 2.3590.4682.3800.4572.1560.5632.4200.2992.3620.4765.569*** 4.572 *** N\widetilde{A}\w resultado1.8541.2331.7501.2161.6851.1632.3011.2222.0791.2576.44** *** 6.3.322.3011.22222.079191.7311.815Number of inhabitants10.2810.81710.2760.7359.8850.75310.6871.03110.3400.92111.133***9.904***Population density5.8030.9875.7521.0055.5430.8676.1261.0275.9520.9345.764***6.161***Unemployment benefits14.5143.75714.7653.56512 .7633.64413.3894.22014.8113.9578.599 *** 8.371 *** Renda média por famÃlia34.7094.04034.4963.84636.393.9403. 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financial position \ddot{e} † '0.558 (0.794) 2.026*(1,159)' '' '' 2,042 *** (0.335) 2,584 (1.762) \dot{e} '1,484 (0.928) \dot{e} 44.068 *** (0.105) 0.192*(0,113) \dot{e} † '1.874 *** (0.171) Population density \dot{e} \dot{a} \dot{A} ours ,, ,, \dot{a} ferences 0.042 (0.064)
\ddot{e} † 0.184 (0.122) 0.042 (0.064) *** (0.022) 0.042 (0.064) *** (0.025) 0.042 (0.064) *** (0.025) 0.119 *** (0.007) (0.011) *** (0.009) 0.008 *** (0.009) Mother Income per Famãlia - 0.036 (0.025) 0.119 *** (0.029) *** (0.009) 0.082*(0.043) \dot{e} '0.068
(0.029) ¢ ë † 0.151 *** (0.029) Intercept - 1,637 (1.388) '15 .336 *** (1.794) 8.200*** (0.850) ¢ âmâ'16.973 *** (2,389) 6,564 *** (1,617) 23,537 *** (1,856) Independent Variablesinstitutional cooperation Municipality- owned firm Private firm Service characteristics Asset specificity Å¢ÂÂ0.0070.0110.035** *Å¢Ë'0.039*Dificuld ade de
mediçã00.0730.074 Ë'0.030 *** Å¢Ë'0.117 *** POLÃTICO POLÃTICO BMA orientation BMA ë † '0.0050.038 *** Emphasis of characteristics of governance in the entry indicators 0.108 *** Å ¢ ë † '0.0050.038 *** Emphasis of characteristics of governance in the entry indicators 0.108 *** Å ¢ ë † '0.0050.038 *** Emphasis of characteristics of governance in the entry indicators 0.108 *** Å ¢ ë † '0.0050.038 *** Emphasis of characteristics of governance in the entry indicators 0.108 *** Å ¢ ë † '0.0050.038 *** Emphasis of characteristics of governance in the entry indicators 0.108 *** Å ¢ ë † '0.0050.038 *** Emphasis of characteristics of governance in the entry indicators 0.108 *** Å ¢ ë † '0.0050.038 *** Emphasis of characteristics of governance in the entry indicators 0.108 *** Å ¢ ë † '0.0050.038 *** Emphasis of characteristics of governance in the entry indicators 0.108 *** Å ¢ ë † '0.0050.038 *** Emphasis of characteristics of governance in the entry indicators 0.108 *** Å ¢ ë † '0.0050.038 *** Emphasis of characteristics of governance in the entry indicators 0.108 *** Å ¢ ë † '0.0050.038 *** Emphasis of characteristics of governance in the entry indicators 0.108 *** Å ¢ ë † '0.0050.038 *** Emphasis of characteristics of governance in the entry indicators 0.108 *** Å ¢ ë † '0.0050.038 *** Emphasis of characteristics of governance in the entry indicators 0.108 *** Å ¢ ë † '0.0050.038 *** Emphasis of characteristics of governance in the entry indicators 0.108 *** Å ¢ ë † '0.0050.038 *** Å ¢ ë † '0.005
output 0.050 *** å ¢ '0.010 *** 0.005 † '0.031 *** 0.005 † '0.031 *** 0.005 † '0.031 *** characteristics financed positions 0.005 † '0.032 *** Control number of inhabitants 0.005 † '0.031 *** characteristics financed positions 0.005 † '0.031 *** 0.005 † '0.031 *** characteristics financed positions 0.005 † '0.031 ***
0.0120.0100.028 *** Results of the multinomial logit model of Table 5 *** Multiminal Results Bands Based on Absolute Various Warm Warns Rivestments Rivests The Prose FirmerserSersus-Firmsus Firmsusus 0.192 (0.659) 0.786 *** (0.177) 0.594 (0.317) 0.594
(0.423) '' '''' (0.423) ' Difficulty in measurement £ & aference 1,258 (1,020) '2.004 *** (0.184) '2,021 *** (0.281) '3,263 *** (0.281) '3,263 *** (0.281) '2.518 *** (0.817) Characteristics of governance of objectives 0.096 (0.137) 0.797 ** (0.369)
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 .732 *** (3,374) 4,911 *** (1,725) 23,643 *** (1,778) Table 6 marginal effects with Based on the dependent absolute notes -houseinternterinter-municipal company Specificity of Murder ë † '0.0070.036 *** ¢ †' 0.039*Difficulty of media0. 0730.074'0.030 *** Å ,** '0.1 17 *** POLICY
CHARACTERISTICS GUIDANCE-OR OR OB BMA BMA'0.035 *** ¢ ë †' 0.001 † '0.0030.039 *** Characteristics of Governan §A Nono Objectives' 0.041 ** 0.0030.044*Å, ,,Å,,'0.006 NO INTENSE INDICATORS0.063 *** ¢ † † '0.004'0.016 †' 0.043 *** NO. 0.008*¢ '0.0030.069 *** POS ITÃ TIAS
FINANCIALSFINANCIAL0.019 *** ¢ '0.0020.015 *** Variable Å \in hyu <° of controlle of inhabitants 0.011 †' 0.031 *** 0.077 *** † '0.036 *** 0.001 MOTHER INCOME FOR FAMANIA '0.0140.0070.036 *** ¢ ë †' 0.029 ***
NOTESPRIVATIZATION means the contract of government service or funds for firms for firms for firms for firms al. The tests show that the municipalities that respond to representative for our research population, as they are one The number of inhabitants and a source of regions similar to the municipalities that do not respond.11 Second, we conducted
additional survey between a panel of experts from 30 municipal financial managers from December 2013 to January 2014, in which we ask that classified the 12 municipal services into two important cost characteristics of transactions - specificity of assets and difficulty of measurement - similar approach followed by Brown and Potoski (2003; 2005)
analyzed two types of characteristics of services. However, as Breman et al. However, this cooperation can also occur through the contract of the execution of one service to another municipality (especially neighboring) (eg Gradus et al. (2014), which shows that great Dutch municipalities (in general) seem to be more focused on NPG than
in NPM, but we also leave it as a tonical for future research. The results show that, as a service , involves more specifications of mothers
of service characteristics for each of the 12 services. As Table 1 indicates, there is a considering dispersion in the classifications of mothers of characteristics for each of the market and privatization, while social -democrats are agest changes, curiously as well as
privatization and privatization reverse. In this article, we extend this dwarf to the Netherlands using a different operationalization from the variables of the pool and capturing the political preferences of voters (represented by the (weighted) participation of different Parties in the Municipal Council) and those of the dominant policy parties
(represented by the councilors) in this decision of contracting. 5 In a sense, we follow Elinder and Jordahl (2013), which distinguish three models from how political ideology influences the decisions of contract. in the party to whom they wish to trust the power to rule the next electoral period. Overall, unconditional means institutional do not show
clear pattern (order), as all forms score higher in at least one variable and lower in another. This is followed by a section in which the results of the service refers to what is diffilled is for the contracting organization to measure the results are presented and discussed. The mediurability of the service refers to what is diffilled is for the contracting organization to measure the results are presented and discussed. The mediurability of the service refers to what is diffilled is for the contracting organization to measure the results are presented and discussed.
service or both (Brown and Potoski 2003, 445). It is expected that the mayor's executive branch is limited. The composition of the Municipal Council depends directly on the results
of the municipal elections; No thresholds of formal elections. Here, the expectation is that the right -wing councilors will use contracts at a larger extension than left -wing councilors. Marginal effects prove these findings and indicate that, in motion, a pattern increase in deviation in the difficulty of measurement decreases the to execute the service
in a company owned by the municipality or in a private company, respectively, 0.030 and 0.117, supporting our second hypothesis (H2). Most of them also had an academic education in the process. ). Our review provides some evidence that the contract is actually related to the governance model of the municipalities, as the municipalities of
municipalities that (in general) put relatively less in the indicators of inputs, processes and output and more in the result indicators, the most likely to be privatized. This freedom is restricted by rules and general requirements established by national and regional governments. (2014) concentrated. Overall, consistent with Brown and
Potoski (2005), the two characteristics of services are positively correlated (Ran ¢ Ady = 0.426), indicating that the relatively difficult measuring services are positively correlated (Ran ¢ Ady = 0.426), indicating that the relatively difficult measuring services are positively correlated (Ran ¢ Ady = 0.426), indicating that the relatively difficult measuring services are positively correlated (Ran ¢ Ady = 0.426), indicating that the relatively difficult measuring services are positively correlated (Ran ¢ Ady = 0.426).
councilors; BMA) and the Municipal Council (MC) of the municipalities. In both studies, garbage collection and the ticnio is a relatively low score to facilitate the measurement. For the Netherlands, Dijkgraaf et al. 2006, Levin and Tadelis 2010). In short, although it is not totally conclusive, most
studies have found that the right -wing policies dominated by leftist poetics. (2014) showed that the number of municipalities with a private company more than the poetics dominated by leftist poetics. (2014) showed that the number of municipalities. For garbage
The number of municipalities with a company owned by the municipality is increasing over time in the Netherlands (Gradus et al. Here, marginal effects indicate that, in motion, a standard increase in population density increases to Probability of executing the
service internally or within a company owned by the municipality at 0.032 and 0.012, respectively. Wald tests for variance Very independent, highly significantly reduces the "error variation" of the model (s) and the careful inspection of the entire
mnlm output also suggests that there is nothing wrong with nothing wrong with the model (nor with any of our other models). It is 28.3% in the process, 32.4% in producing and 15.9% in the process, 32.4% in producing and 15.9% in the entrance, 23.3% in the process, 32.4% in producing and 15.9% in the process and 15.
these varies, both ANOVA and WELCH TEST26 show that the differences in the punctuations of unconditional days between the policy, governance, and financial and municipal characteristics of the four modes of provision of services (inter-municipal
cooperation, municipal company and private company) estimating a multinomial logit model (MNLM). The marginal effects, reported in Table 4, indicate that, in comparison with other institutional forms, in motion, a standard increase in deviation in the specificity of assets increases the likelihood of performing the service within of a company owned
by municipality at 0.035, while decreasing Probability of performing the service within a private company at 0.039. A sample sample The test does not show significant difference in the regional representation between the interviewees and the research population (\hat{a} \notin (11, 86) - 5, 89, pi \notin \hat{a} ference = 0.880). In total we have 86 (municipalities) * 12
 (services) ¢ â â € ¢ â Âdy ¢ Â ¢ â Âro ¢ Âdy ¢ Â ¢ â Âro ¢ Âdy ¢ Â ¢ âference 1032-164 (Values absent) -868 observations of the municipality of the municipality. (2016). From the second half of the 1990s, new developments can be observed, represented by names such as "Public Value" (PV) and "Nine Governance Pan. of the government must be held in a network of
 actors. Consequently, we expect this: municipalities of municipalities of municipalities of which the polers (ie, the aldermen council and the Municipal Council) are also a more right -wing pool orientation, it is more likely to be hired for a private company. As previously argued, from the end of the 1970s and the UNOCio of the 1980s, the privatization of local service
rendering became a problem in many paanes (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004), generally labeled under the guard -new "New Public Management" or NPM. Finally, for socio-economic characteristics, we find, among others, that the smaller municipalities will be more likely to execute a service within an inter-municipal cooperation or in a private
company, and that local unemployment Higher increases the probability of choices to produce the house, which is in accordance with the literature. There are some limits and therefore also some avenues for future research we would like to mention. This is interesting this last effect our first hypothesis (H1) and it is consistent with the argument that
municipalities are reluctant to externalize high asset spectators for a private company to mitigate Behavior and dependence of the path (eg, Brown and Potoksi 2005; Levin and Tadelis 2010). Figure 1 shows remarkable differences. Focus on this literature is increasingly having a broader perspective in which, in addition to the theory of transactions,
other willing approaches, such as Public Choice and Political Sponsorship, are chosen to investigate the determinants Of these choices and their effectiveness (for example, Lipez -De -Silanes et al. We hope that when a municipality puts more on the use of production indicators and results, it may be more willing to hire services to an external provider.
as the use of these indicators in
Dutch municipalities seem to be more focused on NPG than in NPM. For financial characteristics, the results show that the municipality of hiring a service for a private company (instead of carrying out it internally or within an owned company of the municipality), while these companies are
more likely to provide a service within a company owned by the municipality (instead of internal). While the empathic findings of studies that use an approach to transactions cost theory seem to be relatively consistent, as the specificity of the assets is negative and the ease of measurement is positively related to the leisure of contract £ o, the results
of other aspects seem to be less consistent. In this article, our goal is to add to this literature by analyzing the influence of vain complementary factors in theory that can explain the differences in the choices of service delivery modes in local Dutch context. Notably, 71.4% of municipalities hire their cleaning services to a private company. For output
indicators, we get some mixed results. At the low end is cleaning, with a score of 1.50 for specificity of assets and 1.71 for difficulty in measurement. They suggested that for certain types of municipal services, especially collective goods and ordinary real
estate, the services directly, provided that the services are more common, while for services similar to pedan Gio and private, the opposite applies. As they assume a quadratic relationship, this is not maintained for highs as not to be asset. Municipalities with the most arrested financial concerns are most inclined to hire a private company, supporting
our fifth hypothesis (H5) and seem to have less opportunities to start companies owned by municipalities. Gradus et al. Consequently, the weather range of our two variesable ones are between 0.16 and 0.86. We capture this relationship between privatization and other reforms of administration, analyzing the governance of the municipalities in our
study. Municipalities with worse conditions of the labor market apparently are more inclined to provide services (so that they can decide which workers hire) 30 or to contract them to a private company (possibly after making agreements contractuals about which workers hire). 2010). Our research scene differs considerably from Elinder and Jordahl
(2013) in terms of: (1) the result of the polytic system (in its Swedish), the pool parties are often seen as belonging to the block Left or the right block, while a mark is not not to be done for the Holland case); (2) the types of modes of of service that are available (in its configuration, only an option between the modes of delivery of internal
and private services are disposingable, while we are four different modes); and (3) we investigate one (business education). As we have no data for the local part of the hallmark in the Netherlands, we will not formally formally test this model. More specifically, based on the Research Responses of 16
major Dutch municipalities in relation to the goal and structure of the organization, the role of administration and socioeconnected characteristics, the results are similar to those of our main dwarf, and all the conclusions about related
hypotheses remain the same. 2015). Our review reveals that, as a service involves more specificity of assets and more difficulty in media, the probability that the municipalities hire this service is lower (cf. Table 3 reports the results of MNLM and Table 4 estimates of marginal effects.27 For the characteristics of the service, reported
in Table 3, the results show that, as an service involves more specificity of assets, the probability increases that the municipalities choose by executing this service in a private company (in
opposition to one Company owned by the municipality). Then the research used are described. A recent empathic study among large Dutch Municipalities provides some evidence that municipalities differ in the extension in which they implemented elem PPA, NPM and NPG (View Blokker et al. It has a self -noma position and can start local policies
consider it important to the local community. The first studies were inspired by the Public Choice Theory of choice. Finally, in a day, an increase in standard deviation process indicators decreases the likelihood of executing the service within Private company in 0.043, while a standard deviation process indicators increase in standard deviation process indicators decreases the likelihood of executing the service within Private company in 0.043, while a standard deviation process indicators decreases the likelihood of executing the service within Private company in 0.043, while a standard deviation process indicators decreases the likelihood of executing the service within Private company in 0.043, while a standard deviation process indicators decreases the likelihood of executing the service within Private company in 0.043, while a standard deviation process indicators decreases the likelihood of executing the service within Private company in 0.043, while a standard deviation process indicators decreases the likelihood of executing the service within Private company in 0.043, while a standard deviation process indicators decrease in the number of results indicators decreased in the number of executing the service within Private company in 0.043, while a standard deviation process indicators decreased in the number of executing the service within Private company in 0.043, while a standard deviation process indicators decreased in the number of executing the service within Private company in 0.043, while a standard deviation process in 0.043, while 0.043
this probability by 0.069. Control is exerted, concentrating on intra-organizational inputs and processes. Therefore, this presupposes that the political parties they provide to the councilors. Based on your arguments, we raise the hypothesis that: the services that
involve more specificity of assets are less likely to be hired for a private company or owned by a municipality. In US -based studies, related information explanations of the translation cost theory for contract were collected by the municipality. In US -based studies, related information explanations of the translation cost theory for contract were collected by the municipality. In US -based studies, related information explanations of the translation cost theory for contract were collected by the municipal managers research (eg. Brown and Potoski 2005; Levin and Tadelis 2010). Overall, these results agree with
those previously obtained by Zafra-Gã £ A³mez et al. Conservative liberal council members of the Social Council members of the social Council members of the market and privatization, while members of the social Council members of the social Council members of the social council members are in favor of change, particularly in relation to the market and privatization, while members of the social council members are in favor of change, particularly in relation to the market and privatization.
while for other political parties there were no weak effects. The number of motives formulated is about 16, and the number of the input, process, output and results used as we used, about 11, 17, 21 and 11, respectively. In addition, the probability that an service is executed in a private company (in internal or within an inter-municipal cooperation)
increases that a municipality (usually) uses Less process indicators and more results, while the probability that an service is performed within an inter-municipality (in uses more results, while the probability that an service is performed within an inter-municipality (in uses more results, while the probability that an service is performed within an inter-municipality (in uses more results, while the probability that an service is performed within an inter-municipality (in uses more results, while the probability that an unicipality (in uses more results) and inter-municipality (in uses more results).
in the choices of the modes of provision of services. Npm proportion, Other things, to make relationships between and within units more based on contracts and hold managers more explicitly explicitly for results and researched themselves considerably in the academy since
the 80's. Under the traditional progressive policy (PPA) public administration, the focus is on compliance with rules and regulations. (2003; 2007) concentrated on different characteristics of goods as an indicator of the two costumes of cost of
transactions, which we based on Brown and Potoski (2005), and asked respondents to classify each service on a Likert scale of Five points for specificity and measurement of active difficulty. Similarly, the probability that an service is executed within an inter-municipal cooperation (in opposition to internal or within a private company) decreases that
a municipality (usually) uses more entry indicators. It should be noted that Geert Wilders' Popularist Party of Freedom (PVV) is almost nonexistent in the location. Marginal effects indicate that, in motion, an increase in standard deviation in the number of inhabitants increases the likelihood of executing the service within a company owned by the
municipality by 0.097, while decreasing the likelihood of executing the servant In the inter-municipal cooperation or within a private company at 0.031 and 0.061, respectively. Under this governance of governance, the competitive markets are used to provide for services and the focus of control is in the leaves. (2014) analyzed at what point these
municipalities are characteristic of PPA, NPM and NPG. In this malesis, we control the four socioeconnected characteristics and the pattern errors of the cluster by municipality based on the assumption that their choices of modes of services are independent in all municipal municipalities. No within them (cf. marginal effects indicate that, in
motion, an increase in standard deviation in the left-right guidance of councilors increases the likelihood of executing the service in -all from 0.033.29 These findings apart from our third hypothesis (H3). For the characteristics of governance, the results
 indicate that the governance model of the municipalities, as close by the (relative) (relative) that they put in different types of performance indicators, also related to their choices of modes of provision of services. Garbage, all four forms are used in a considerable extension. These results are disposedable upon request. at 0.019, while decreasing the
likelihood of executing the service with in u Ma Cooperation inter-municipal in 0.024. (2014). Finally, for socio-economic characteristics, the results show that there is a greater likelihood that smaller municipal in 0.024. (2014). Finally, while, in greater
municipalities, the likelihood of hiring it to a private company is higher than doing it within an inter-municipal cooperation, and the likelihood of contracting it for a company owned by the municipality is larger (compared to the other three institutional forms). Following Elinder and Jordahl (2013), we distinguished between the general political
preferences expressed by voters (in our case, represented by the members of the Municipal Council) and those of the municipalities that the municipalities put in the Types of performance indicators and, therefore, also
partially apart our fourth hypothesis (H4). This study investigates the influence of the municipalities of four modes of service delivery (internal, inter-municipal cooperation, company owned by the municipality and private company). For the characteristics of governance, we
analyze the relative process that is placed in different types of performance indicators, where we distinguish between entry, process, output and result indicators. The dominant vision in the literature of the public administration is that adverse financial situations lead to external agreements, rather than internal hierarchical solutions (Silanes et al
Fleurke and Willemse (2006, 75) note that â € "it is widely believed that the Dutch councils are the main ones of municipal decisions. Stain and operational decisions. Stain and operational decisions are the municipal decisions. Stain and operational decisions are the municipal decisions.
preferential preference for the NPM governance of governance for the NPG governance, which is aligned with the results of Blokker et al. In a separate dwarf, the results show that the municipal cooperation above to execute an
international service TE, within a company owned by the municipality, or with a private company.28 In general, these results beyond previous studies that also showed that left -left municipalities, while relatively right -the oriented
municipalities are a natural preference Contrata —the Party Part (Sundell and Lapuente The next section analyzes the recent literature on the determinants of the municipalities of the options of modes of provision of services. Likewise, a standard deviation increase in the number of entry indicators decreases the likelihood of executing the
 service within an inter-municipal cooperation by 0.023, while an increase in deviation standard in the number of results indicators increases this probability by 0.008. In addition, we discuss the characteristics of companies owned by the municipality, which, in comparison with many other paan, is a relatively common institutional form in the
Netherlands. This also leads to the increase in the support of the unions of the pilling employees (£ £-de-silanes et al. This classification is based on a model that assumes that institutions and/or programs These are configured to meet some specific socioeconamic needs (Polltt (Polltt and Bouckaert 2004). In the literature, they are analyzed â € ught,
especially the costs of garbage collection, but it is interesting to have an image Broadly. Summary, in this study investigates the influence of the legal, political, governance and financial characteristics in the choices of four municipal ties of four services modes of delivery (inter-municipal cooperation, municipal company and company Private) in the
local government scenery. To measure the ideological (left-right) orientation of the city council, we use the municipal council (left-right) orientation of the city council (left-right) orientation or city cou
ranging from € œIn excellent € œExtreme Rightâ € for all Dutch national political parties .23 for Each municipality, we calculate the left-right orientation of the councilors and the Municipal Council considering the proportion of members of the different political parties that Part of these local political parties and the Municipality, we calculate the left-right orientation of the councilors and the Municipality, we calculate the left-right orientation of the councilors and the Municipality, we calculate the left-right orientation of the councilors and the Municipality orientation or the councilors and the Municipality orientation of the councilors and the Municipality orientation or the councilors and the councilors are considered as the councilors are c
councilors of the so -called independent local parties were excluded from the boards because classify them on a right-hand scale (Boogers and Voerman 2010). As previously argued, already that the governance model of a municipality can not be observed directly, and where we know, an appropriate measuring instrument has not yet been developed.
proxy for this model analyzing the (relative) process that municipalities place in different types of performance indicators. Recent research in the Netherlands, the page collection mode between 1998 and 2010, with two commuters of the switches in
direction. External, especially when hiring (Gradus et al. The NPM will open a large number of reforms. 2014) .8, we will open a large number of reforms. 2014) .8, we will open a large number of reforms. 2014) .8, we will open a large number of reforms. 2014) .8, we will open a large number of reforms. 2014) .8, we will open a large number of reforms. 2014) .8, we will open a large number of reforms. 2014) .8, we will open a large number of reforms. 2014) .8, we will open a large number of reforms. 2014) .8, we will open a large number of reforms. 2014) .8, we will open a large number of reforms. 2014) .8, we will open a large number of reforms. 2014) .8, we will open a large number of reforms. 2014) .8, we will open a large number of reforms. 2014) .8, we will open a large number of reforms. 2014) .8, we will open a large number of reforms. 2014) .8, we will open a large number of reforms. 2014) .8, we will open a large number of reforms. 2014) .8, we will open a large number of reforms. 2014) .8, we will open a large number of reforms. 2014) .8, we will open a large number of reforms. 2014) .8, we will open a large number of reforms. 2014) .8, we will open a large number of reforms. 2014) .8, we will open a large number of reforms. 2014) .8, we will open a large number of reforms numbe
indicate that multicolinearity is not a problem in this dwarf (vif Mã © dio = Äferences 2.00; Varus between 1.12 (To guide left-right BMA) and 3.47 (for the input indicators))) nor in the dwarf, including the left-right BMA) and 3.55 (for the input indicators)). In addition, the
punishment of the financial position is 0.140. We distinguished between four modes of provision of services (inter-municipal cooperation, municipal property and private company) and focus on 12 municipal services. Therefore, this question is still debated from the time of view. Groot and Brote 2004). At -test for two independent samples does not
show significant difference in size (measured as the natural registration of the number of inhabitants) between respondents (t (422) \& afference = \&, \&, \&, -1.582, Pa \& afference 0.114). They showed that greater Policy takes A Exteriorization £ £ o of thus moving to external agents. To ensure reliability between
evaluators, the coding occurred in vain rounds; In each round, a session was held between research assistants and one of the authors of this article to discuss the operationalization of the variables â € hydles and coding decisions. The day of classifications between the interviewees to create a general score for the specificity of assets and difficulty of
measurement for each service. While the main distinction made was traditionally among the modes of internal and external (privatized) service delivery, other forms, such as inter-municipal cooperation and companies owned by the municipality, they can now be commonly observed. It should be noted that these services are perceived similarly
between the Dutch and the US administrators. These last effects partially support our fourth hypothesis (H4) and show that the municipalities that focus on the results seem to prefer the most based production in the market. In addition, the circumstance (2014), we hope that privatization decisions can be partially driven by previous experiences or
preferably market approaches. In total, 24 (80.0%) of these managers responded to this second survey. The end section summarizes and concludes. At the end of the 1970s and the innate of the 1980s, the privatization of local service rendering became a problem in many oECD (and others) paans (pollit and Bouckaert 2004) .1 This measure was part
of a package of reforms, which, in literature, was labeled as "New Public Management" or its abbreviation, NPM (Hood 1995). Second, cost functions can be evaluated. The common expectation is that conservative parties are more in favor of private services than those of socialist or social democratic ideologies (Petersen et al. In general, we hope
that the municipalities will be inclined to provide services if unemployment in a municipality is high, because Another institutional form would make it less likely for workers to be hired locally (cf. results also show that, as a service involves more difficulty in media, probability increases that municipalities choose execution It publicly, internally or
within an inter, municipal cooperation. Consequently, we raise the hypothesis that: municipalities of 
(Hendriks and Tops 2003). The contract of a private company with 33, 3%, the most common institutional form, 17, but contracting for a company owned by the municipality18 and inter-municipal cooperation also frequently used. There were some empathic evidence for these hypotheses; , pair A The Italian Placous Services where privatization
(partial) has been demonstrated (significantly) decrease total costs (Garrone et al. In the 2010 local election, the PVV has only seats and no councilors in the parliamentary elections. Before calculating the natural log of these varies, we anchor the mother
value in their distribution in exactly 1.0 to deal with the question that the logarithm of a number of 0 is undefined. Pearson correlations can be obtained from the authors upon request. The Welch test is reported to be a year for the Anova test because, for variables, the assumption of homogeneity of variation is not met. Its main elements are the
municipal council and the mayor and councilors' council. Performance indicators can be divided into different categories, such as garbage collection, cleaning and e Administration is changing from an ideological debate to a more appropriate discussion of the
institutional and econhamic factors that determine the mode of delivery (see also Hefetz et al. 2009; Levin and Tadelis 2010). Fifth, other local services can be analyzed, as it would be interesting to investigate the question of mixed and hubby modes of delivery, where organizations belong together by a municipality and a private company (Bel et al.
(2003), Menard (2001) and Pregibon (1981). Previous research on Dutch garbage collection has shown that the high concentration in the regions increases costs and therefore (in part) compensates for the advantage of hiring (see Dijkgraaf and Gradus 2007; Gradus et al. It seems that smaller municipalities can enjoy the economies of scale by inter-
municipal cooperation (see also Dijkgraaaf and Gradus 2013) or hiring a private company, while the larger municipalities are Typically more innovative and more bureaucratic capacity to deal with the complexities and judicial complexities involved in the municipality -the marginal effects indicate that, in motion, a standard increase in diversion in
mother income Day by Fumãlia increases the p QUABILITY TO RUBS T A SERVICE WITHIN A COMPANY PROPERTY OF THE CITY by 0.028, while decreasing the likelihood of executing the service within a private company at 0.027. For other municipal services, the contract of a private company is less common. These marginal effects are
disposedable upon request. This discovery is consistent with the sponsorship model, which states that controversy can prefer internal delivery above the contract, as the first offers more opportunities to employ local personnel and can also increase the support of unions of EMPLOYERS PLICES. Members of the Municipal Council, on the other hand,
may consider inter-municipal cooperation as a valuable alternative for keeping controversy and employment within the sector. (2009) also show, for the US context, that the linear effects of the important service. Also see sundell and lapuent (2012) for an extensive discussion of these expectations. It should be noted that the
Municipal Council in the Netherlands must focus its attention on the formulation of policies and evaluation of the management of the municipality. As discussed earlier, for this additional dwarf, we measure these characteristics based on the natural record of
the number of performance objectives and indicators, as identified in the 2010 annual reports of the municipalities. For a company owned by municipalities. For a company owned by municipalities. For a company owned by municipalities.
by the municipality and 23.3% hired for a private company (see also table 1). Two research assistants identified the reported number of objectives formulated and used performance indicators in these annual reports, distinguishing between input, process, output and results indicators (eg., Hatry 2006; Bouckaert and Halligan 2008). According to this
theory, the monopolization of the services will result in overproduction and inefficiency, while the contract will lead to lower spending (BOYNE 1998). The theory of translation costs relaxed this positive view of the contract will lead to lower spending (BOYNE 1998).
called transactions. As reflected by the great SDS, however, there are great differences among the municipalities in terms of these percentages. Therefore, we raise the hypothesis that: services of municipalities in terms of these percentages.
and result, the most likely to be hired for a private or owned company of a municipality. The relationship between financial conditions and the decision to hire the rendering of public servants has been a question of strong context in the literature. These municipalities have been excluded because they have special legal, administrative and financial
agreements with the central government, which do not apply to other Dutch municipalities (cf. as some of them were constructed (difficulty of hiring and sensitivity to the resident), which are very common with the used â € hydons by Brown and Potoski (2005). Although this research was conducted about
afterwards our research Initial, we believe we can use this data in a dwarf, such as the characteristics and the legal regulations for the studied services have changed. We specifically address these municipal financial managers, as they should have a wide general view Municipal Services and the reasons for the decision -making decisions. Specific
investments, this will create a barrier to the service providers. Data on these political characteristics were colleagues cted From Gids Gementebesturen (Board Municipal Guide), published annually by the poisoning van Nederlandse Gementebesturen (Board Municipal Guide), published annually by the poisoning van Nederlandse Gementebesturen (Board Municipal Guide), published annually by the poisoning van Nederlandse Gementebesturen (Board Municipal Guide), published annually by the poisoning van Nederlandse Gementebesturen (Board Municipal Guide), published annually by the poisoning van Nederlandse Gementebesturen (Board Municipal Guide), published annually by the poisoning van Nederlandse Gementebesturen (Board Municipal Guide), published annually by the poisoning van Nederlandse Gementebesturen (Board Municipal Guide), published annually by the poisoning van Nederlandse Gementebesturen (Board Municipal Guide), published annually by the poisoning van Nederlandse Gementebesturen (Board Municipal Guide), published annually by the poisoning van Nederlandse Gementebesturen (Board Municipal Guide), published annually by the poisoning van Nederlandse Gementebesturen (Board Municipal Guide), published annually by the poisoning van Nederlandse Gementebesturen (Board Municipal Guide), published annually by the poisoning van Nederlandse Gementebesturen (Board Municipal Guide), published annually by the poisoning van Nederlandse Gementebesturen (Board Municipal Guide), published annually by the poisoning van Nederlandse Guide), published annually by the poisoning van Nederlandse Guide), published annually by the poisoning van Nederlandse Guide (Board Municipal Guide), published annually by the poisoning van Nederlandse Guide (Board Municipal Guide), published annually by the poisoning van Nederlandse Guide (Board Municipal Guide), published annually by the poisoning van Nederlandse Guide (Board Municipal Guide), published annually by the poisoning van Nederlandse Guide (Board Municipal Guide), published annually by the poiso
Potoski (2005), we assume that a municipality hires only one service if (almost) all delivery is from a owned or private company or not, if there is only any contracts With a company. This is consistent with file data (administrative) (see also Gradus et al. maneuver to translate and shape a poetry into needs This scenery offers us the
opportunity to analyze differences in the modes of provision of services, while the activities to be performed are more or less comparable. The measurement scale of measurement was anchored by the very fancil (punctuated 1) and very difficult
(punctuated 5) words. 2012). In addition, we also find evidence that the governance model of the municipalities, as proceeded by the (relative) (absolute) indicators they use, This is related to options for delivery of services. Interestingly, however, the
two of the political plants were also different preferences, which seems to be due to their different responsibilities. We chose these spectable services, as previous studies have shown that these are most frequently subject to contract decisions in the Holling context (Ter Bogt 2008; WASSENAAR 2011) .14 As it indicates Bogt (1999), a spectrum of
organizational forms for the bullshit the provision of services can be observed. This item is formulated as follows: â € œWhy please, the box that best describes the general ideology of each party on a scale ranging from 0 (extreme left) to 10 (far right). For the Dutch national political parties, the following scores were provided by (14) specialists: SP
(0.16) - GL (0.26) - PVDA (0.39) - D66 (0.50) - Cu (0.54) - CDA (0.63) - SGP (0.78) - CDA (0.63) - CDA (0.63)
the modes of provision of services for collection garbage in the Dutch municipalities, Gradus et al. However, some empathic discoveries suggest that it contracts in the The noisy can really be less prevalent if there is financial stress (Warner and Hefetz 2012; Rodrigues et al. More recent studies such as Warner and Hefetz (2012), not only take into
account the characteristics of the service, but also the characteristics of the municipality and its environment, such as management, market and socio -economic factors. These costs do not only include administrative costs, but also the costs of incomplete contracts resulting from activities of activities Monitoring and Control (Williamson 1997).
Brown and Potoski 2003; 2005). Since councilors are the city's daily managers, they may have a preference for hiring an activity completely internally. Likewise, in motion and compared to the category of refinement (ie, the costs of the process placed on the results indicators), an increase in standard deviation in the
nozzle in the entry indicators, Process and output decreases the likelihood of executing the service within a municipal cooperation by, respectively, 0.029, 0.019 and 0.010. We include the number of people with benefits of unemployment as a measure of the conditions of the labor market. Similar to Brown and Potoski (2005), we are interested in two
characteristics: specificity of assets and difficulty of measurement.19 In December 2013 to January 2014,20, we sent a question for a panel of experts from 30 municipal financial managers.21 In total, 24 (80.0%) of these managers responded to this survey. However, we have not included the "Security" service, in addition to extending its list by
adding the serials ¢ Å,¬ å "Ceteria, ¢ â Å ours "Maintenance of roads" (as a substitute for "Infrastructure Works"), "Maintenance of Green", "Sports Installations", and ¢ Åferences "Pancheking Management". A Public Entity of WGR (Law on Common Arrangements), where the Executive Board is directed by of the participating municipalities. A total of
87 municipalities returned the questionnaire, of which it was useless, providing a usable response rate of 20.2%. Since 2002, councilors need not be members of the Municipal Council, although they need the support of a majority of the Council. Note that both tests provide similar results. Because the estimated VCE is not enough classification to
perform the model test, the state (as a warning) relates the statistical of the Qui-square model based on a rije of bamily logging dwarfs, we verify the database as to potentially influential data points, carefully examining the
 leverage, discrepancy and the influence of all cases using the measurements and cutting points suggested by Cohen et al. Based on a meta-regress, Bel and Fageda (2009) showed that the influence of political ideology may be specific to context, as they found that ideology plays a larger role in larger cities in the US, as well as ( to a lesser extent) in
European cases. Overall, it seems that the municipality (in opposition will be more likely to choose the most based solutions on the market. Likewise, the probability that a service is executed within a company owned by the municipality (in opposition home) decreases that a municipality (usually) places more in the entry indicators,
while The likelihood of an service is executed in a private company (in opposition to a company owned by the municipality) decreases that a (general) municipality puts more on the process indicators. In the (final) of the 80s, a change was made (in the Netherlands, but also in other places) of the PPA for the new Plan (NPM), but the speech elements
of the NPM varied among the (government of the government of) paaes (groot and botture 2008). (2003) found only weak evidence for the ideological motivation of Between public and private contractors for primary education in
suction. In addition, the most benefited municipalities of unemployment are a lower probability of executing a service within an inter-municipal cooperation or a
company owned by the municipality). First, we conducted a multipurpose survey among 426 Dutch municipalities in the period from December 2010 to February 2011.10 In this survey, we asked respondents, who held a position of financial management of not healthy, as their municipality organized 12 municipal services. This is not simply
implementing blind implementation, however, but co-government, as, according to Breeman et al. The preferred system for the provision of services is using the unified government departments of one. Finally, the sponsorship model basically argues that there may be a distance between voters and the preferences of controversies, as the support of
pool decisions can play a role. With regard to contracting, controversy can derive significant benefits from internal production, such as using local employees, employees.
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